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From Nuclear Hedging to Korea-Japan 




This article discusses both the positive and negative effects of Japan's three 
nuclear strategies: nuclear hedging, nuclear breakout, and the Korea-Japan 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (KJNWFZ). Nuclear hedging has been the 
longest established strategy to protect Japan's national security but it will 
become increasingly unreliable in the coming decades. Nuclear breakout, 
an alternative strategy, is impractical due to its high costs. In comparison, 
this article argues that KJNWFZ is the ideal option for Japan's future nuclear 
strategy. However, in recent years, the Japanese government has maintained 
the status quo, despite the scale of anti-nuclear protest across the country 
following the Fukushima crisis. Civilian anti-nuclear does not effectively in-
ﬂuence nuclear strategy decision-making, due to a combination of national 
electoral politics, interests groups, the 'veto players' of the right-wing, and 
the broader regional security context. In conclusion, the nuclear hedging 
policy remains the accepted balance of interests supported by decision-makers.
Keywords: Japan, Nuclear Policy, Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, Nuclear 
Hedging, Nuclear Breakout
Introduction
A combination of factors has brought the idea of 'nuclear free world' 
back to the horizon in recent years (White and Santoro 2012: 1). In the 
post-Cold War era, the traditional rationale for using nuclear weapons 
no longer retains salience or moral justiﬁcation. Due to the prolifera-
tion of nuclear technology and ﬁssile materials around the world, there 
is increasing concern about the potential for nuclear terrorist attacks. 
In response to the proliferation issue, nuclear deterrence is part of the 
problem, not its solution (Mack 1992); the establishment of Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) may provide a fundamentally different 
alternative. 
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  NWFZs seek to limit and delegitimise nuclear weapons in a gradual 
way: 'the 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission indicated that 
NWFZs ﬁlled important “gaps” in the NPT regime, as well as “comple-
ment and reinforce” it' (Taylor et al 2013: 80). The International Com-
mission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament also strongly 
supported the utility of NWFZ.1 At the May 2010 Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, it was widely agreed that NWFZs 
had played an essential role in contributing to regional peace and the 
global agenda of non-proliferation (Davies 2010).2
  Since the Northeast Asia region has been under the shadow of 
nuclear proliferation and the arms race for decades, there have been a 
number of proposals for the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone (NEANWFZ) in recent years. One of the most 
inspiring plans, arguing for the creation of the Korea-Japan Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone (KJNWFZ), was proposed by the Nautilus Institute. 
Michael Hamel-Green, Peter Hayes and other scholars at the Nautilus 
Institute have been formative in discussions of the KJNWFZ.  In this 
study, I examine the KJNWFZ from the perspective of Japan. I compare 
the new framework with Tokyo's current nuclear hedging policy and 
nuclear breakout as alternatives. In closing, I focus on Japan's security 
environment, domestic politics and nuclear policy decision-making 
process. As discussion of KJNWFZ from the Japanese perspective is still 
limited (Hayes 2010; Umebayashi 2013)3, I include a detailed analysis of 
the costs and beneﬁts of the three nuclear strategies, and contend that 
the KJNWFZ seems to be a more effective and reliable strategy in the 
long term. With this in mind, it is puzzling to note that the Japanese 
government has not considered the KJNWFZ proposal more seriously, 
particularly given the rising anti-nuclear sentiment across the country 
following the Fukushima nuclear crisis and the 70th anniversary of the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
I therefore aim to identify the strategic actors in Japan's nuclear deci-
sion-making and discuss their concerns about the available options. I 
use an international relations approach to describe the security threat 
Japan is facing and borrow the 'veto-players' model (Ganghof 2003; 
Tsebelis 2000; Hymans 2011) to reveal the decision-making circle. The 
theoretical framework encompasses both bureaucratic struggles and 
the regional security context as nuclear proliferation or restraint is not 
only about national security but is also determined through political 
debate and normative symbols (Sagan 1997). I also seek to explain how 
strategic players with particular security perceptions inﬂuence the deci-
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sion-making behind Japan's nuclear strategy. I contend that although 
the KJNWFZ plan has many advantages, the regional security dynamics 
render the idea of liberal institutionalism unconvincing. As most of the 
decision-makers respond to threats with a 'realist approach', nuclear 
hedging continues to serve the best interests of all strategic players.
This article has signiﬁcant policy implications for the nonproliferation 
and security debates of Northeast Asia. By comparing the relatively new 
proposal of a nuclear weapons free zone with the better-known nuclear 
hedging and nuclear breakout policies, it provides a better understand-
ing of Japan's nuclear strategy options and the calculation of costs and 
beneﬁts. It also sheds light on the possibility of a nuclear weapons free 
zone as an alternative for regional security, given that North Korea 
conducted nuclear tests in 2013 and 2016 after the stalemate of the Six 
Party Talks.4 This study shows how states deal with the issues of nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear restraint by identifying strategic actors in the 
decision-making circle and revealing how both bureaucratic competition 
(internal) and threat perceptions (external) inﬂuence their preferences. 
Thus, it not only reveals the multi-causality of Japan's nuclear restraint 
but also, more importantly, explains Tokyo's reluctance to abolish its 
nuclear potential.
The Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (KJNWFZ) 
Initiative
The idea of NWFZ in Northeast Asia is not new. In fact, there have been 
numerous references to the idea in the speeches and declaratory policies 
of the leaders of North Korea, the USSR, and the Socialist Party of Japan 
since the late 1970s (Kihl and Hayes 1997: 381). While the focus of previ-
ous NEANWFZ proposals has either concentrated on the Korean penin-
sula or covered the whole Northeast Asian region, an alternative way 
forward will be the initial establishment of a NWFZ between Japan and 
South Korea, with North Korea encouraged to join later. This is the pro-
posal advanced by the Nautilus Institute's Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone (KJNWFZ) Concept Paper (Nautilus Institute 2010).5 
Such a bilateral zone, with the door held open to North Korea to join at a later 
stage, would act as a circuit-breaker in the stalemated nuclear confrontation; 
preﬁgure a US negative security guarantee to North Korea in a future 
rapprochement; and reduce ongoing regional anxieties by locking both 
South Korea and Japan into a legally binding non-nuclear security posture. 
(Tanter and Hayes 2011: 16)
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The KJNWFZ initiative will be beneﬁcial to Japan for several reasons:
1) The establishment of KJNWFZ will protect Japan's national security 
from nuclear strike or nuclear blackmail. Although the 'nuclear 
umbrella' provided by the US has to be removed according to the 
framework of NWFZ, it will provide compensating protection 
through negative security assurance (NSA) from both China and 
Russia, and positive security assurance from the United Nations 
Security Council. Since Tokyo has territorial disputes with Beijing 
and Moscow, the legally binding guarantees that both China and 
Russia cannot use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Japan 
will be strategically essential (China has made 'no ﬁrst use' a part 
of its nuclear principle as presented at the United Nations in 1995, 
but it is still a voluntary compliance). 
2) Such zones will encourage both Tokyo and Seoul to reafﬁrm their 
commitments to remain non-nuclear so as to defuse any potential 
nuclear arms race. Both Japan and South Korea have the capacity 
to rapidly develop and acquire nuclear weapons. Even though the 
US is providing extended deterrence to protect Japan and South 
Korea, it is still possible that the further development of North Ko-
rea's nuclear capability could provide a pretext for either or both 
countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons (Green 2010).6 Due 
to the historical issues and territorial disputes with the South Korea, 
it would be the worst-case scenario for Japan to face two nuclear-
armed Koreas. However, the KJNWFZ plan would prevent this 
scenario permanently. It will also help dilute the mutual suspicion 
between Seoul and Tokyo, especially given the acceleration of the 
latter's remilitarization in recent years.
3) The KJNWFZ will also serve as a conﬁdence-building measure 
to address the North Korean nuclear issue. While Pyeongyang 
continues to interlock nuclear weapons with its regime survival, 
the KJNWFZ will be an important inducement to the North to 
reconsider its security calculus (Green 2010).7 The removal of US 
extended deterrence and the legally binding non-nuclear status 
of both Japan and South Korea will reduce threat perceptions and 
rationales for North Korea's nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, since the 
door is open for a denuclearized North Korea to join the KJNWFZ 
at some point, it will address Pyeongyang's longstanding demand 
for nuclear reassurances within a multilateral framework and serve 
as a stepping-stone to improve relations with its neighbours (Sigal 
2011: 35). There is always uncertainty about the future strategy of 
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North Korea, but the KJNWFZ will certainly help to ease regional 
tensions and contribute to a long-term denuclearized outcome.
4) The establishment of KJNWFZ will increase Japan's soft power as a 
country following the path of peaceful development. It will not only 
dispel doubts held by regional players such as China and Korea, 
but also ease international suspicions about Japan's accumulation 
of plutonium and proactive remilitarization. As the only country 
to have suffered from the tragedy of nuclear attack, Japan has the 
moral authority to remind the world community of the precious 
sacriﬁces of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Thakur 1998: 150). Through 
joining the NWFZ, Tokyo will take the leading role in the global 
agenda of non-proliferation.
5) Finally, the spillover effects of the KJNWFZ will be crucial to 
regional integration in the following decades. Despite the secu-
rity interdependence of this region, there has been no multilateral 
security institution to sustain peace and stability. The Six Party 
Talks, which had been regarded as the most promising regional 
security framework to date, have been stalled for over ﬁve years. 
Under these circumstances, the working experience of KJNWFZ 
will promote cooperation and sustain mutual conﬁdence in order to 
address other security issues. 'The vicious cycle of fear, mistrust and 
hostility sustaining open or ambiguous nuclear-weapons programs 
and postures can be replaced by the virtuous cycle of unequivocal 
non-nuclear status sustaining mutual conﬁdence and cooperation' 
(Thakur 1998: 27). Through expanding the KJNWFZ into the NWFZ 
covering the whole Northeast Asia in the future, Tokyo will enjoy 
a great inﬂuence in regional affairs.
To implement the idea of KJNWFZ, the attitudes of other regional 
players will largely decide whether this kind of plan will prove feasible. 
The NSA from nuclear-weapon states is an indispensable part of a suc-
cessful NWFZ framework. 
It seems clear that both Russia and China will provide NSAs to Korea 
and Japan. It is in Moscow's interest to ensure the stability of the Far 
East and prevent further proliferation in the region. It is also essential 
for Beijing to have a stable regional order and the NSA is in accordance 
with its 'no-ﬁrst-use' principle. There are some doubts as to whether 
Beijing is willing to give a legally binding guarantee to Japan but there 
are also some precedents. China accepted NSA to Kazakhstan in 1995 
and conﬁrmed it in 2004  in order to promote denuclearization and es-
tablishment of the NWFZ in Central Asia. China also provided the same 
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NSA to Ukraine in 2013. It seems likely that Beijing is willing to grant 
NSA to more countries to protect the NPT regime and maintain regional 
stability. Since the KJNWFZ will not require Russia and China to reduce 
nuclear warheads and redeploy in their own territories, both countries 
will support the initiative so that they can lock the non-nuclear status of 
Japan and Korea as well as build trust with the North Korea at no cost.
The US may be concerned that the KJNWFZ will hinder its interest in 
free navigation, as American ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons 
will not be allowed into the zone. However, the potential beneﬁts out-
weigh the disadvantages. A KJNWFZ will restrain the emergence of new 
nuclear-weapon states in Northeast Asia. After North Korea's nuclear 
test at the beginning of 2016, there has been a policy debate on whether 
the US should further pressure or re-engage North Korea as the 'stra-
tegic patience' failed (China File 2016; The Diplomat 2016; Hufﬁngton 
Post 2016).8 The KJNWFZ plan might serve as a new framework to help 
address the North Korea issue, establish mechanisms for engagement 
and dialogue, and restore mutual trust. President Barack Obama lent 
strong rhetorical support to creating a nuclear-weapons-free world and 
the KJNWFZ is also in line with the declaratory nuclear policy under 
his administration, which includes a ﬁrmer support of NSA (US, The 
White House: Ofﬁce of the Press 2010).9 Although some might claim that 
the KJNWFZ was only attractive to the Obama administration due to 
the president's personal vision, it is arguably always in the US' interest 
to maintain the NPT regime, regardless of who the next president is. 
Despite the stir caused by Donald Trump's support for both Japan and 
South Korea developing nuclear weapons (The New York Times 2016),10 
the KJNWFZ plan will not only be compatible with Trump's pulling back 
policy but will also prevent a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia. 
It would deﬁnitely promote the global Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
regime and might be utilized as a disarmament negotiation with Russia 
and China in the long term. Although the removal of extended deter-
rence seems a negative factor to the US alliance systems in Northeast 
Asia, it will anchor greater American conventional forces to play the 
pivotal role of regional balancer (Hayes and Bruce 2011: 84-85). Even 
if some member of the KJNWFZ violates the regulations or an extraor-
dinary event takes place, the US can still withdraw from the treaty (as 
indicated in the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia 
and Protocols) and retrieve extended deterrence.
Last but not least, South Korea's attitude towards KJNWFZ is also 
critical. The recent nuclear test from Pyongyang has revitalized discus-
_________________________________________________________________________87
_____________________________________________________ Japan's Nuclear Options
sion about nuclear armament in Seoul (Washington Post 2016)11. How-
ever, triggering the nuclear domino might still be too risky for South 
Korea. In fact, besides the direct threat from the North, the complicated 
security environment has brought the South a number of strategic con-
cerns, including the bilateral relations with Japan and its stockpile of 
plutonium, the reliability of the extended deterrence from the US, and 
relations with China and Russia as regional nuclear weapon states (Mack 
1995: 107). Joining in the KJNWFZ is not an unrealistic option for South 
Korea, as most of these security concerns could be greatly improved. 
Concern about Japan's plutonium economy will be alleviated. Despite 
the removal of nuclear extended deterrence from the US, the legally 
guaranteed NSA will be provided as compensation. It will also serve as 
a conﬁdence-building measure to restore the dialogue between South 
and North. Since South Korea is a loyal member of the NPT regime, its 
nuclear policy is completely in line with the KJNWFZ.
As discussed above, KJNWFZ is a feasible plan bringing strategic 
beneﬁts to Tokyo in the long term. It will act as an essential circuit-
breaker in the downward spiral of mistrust in Northeast Asia. It will 
serve to conﬁrm the current non-nuclear-weapon status of Japan and 
South Korea, and replace the 'nuclear umbrella' with the NSA from nu-
clear-weapon states, while acting as a measure of conﬁdence-building 
to make North Korea join such a zone later (Green 2011: 90-112). With 
the further development of the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone in the future, Japan will not only protect itself from nuclear strike, 
but also gain leverage in anti-proliferation at both regional and global 
level. This is not to say that both Japan and South Korea should initiate 
the plan right now: bilateral relations are variable and there may not 
be political momentum to push for it. Nonetheless, the analysis above 
has demonstrated that the plan is practical and in line with Japan's 
strategic interests. 
The Problems of Current Nuclear Hedging Policy
Compared with the relatively recent idea of the KJNWFZ, Japan has a 
long history of nuclear hedging policy since the beginning of the Cold 
War. Evelyn Goh deﬁnes hedging in general terms as 'taking action to 
ensure against undesirable outcomes, usually by betting on multiple 
alternative positions' (Goh 2005: 2). Levite deﬁnes nuclear hedging as 
'a strategy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback' (Levite 
2002/3: 59). Tokyo regards a strategy of calculated ambiguity as its best 
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option; it possesses nuclear capability on the one hand and remains 
committed to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles on the other. However, 
the extended deterrence from the US, which serves as the cornerstone 
of Tokyo's hedging, was weakened due to the Obama administration's 
ambitious vision of creating a world without nuclear weapons. With 
the continuing rise of China's military power, Japan's threat perceptions 
and abandonment anxiety will cast further doubts on the credibility of 
nuclear umbrella. Thus, the nuclear hedging policy will not be as effec-
tive as it once was, and an alternative framework will be considered to 
secure Tokyo's interests in the long term.
Throughout most of the Cold War, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
and the Four Nuclear Policies demonstrated Japan's ofﬁcial attitude to-
wards the nuclear development.12 But a number of politicians and scholars 
have long been ambivalent about whether to acquire nuclear weapons: 
Memories of horriﬁc nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have 
sustained anti-nuclear sentiment and helped justify national policies 
championing non-proliferation and forgoing an indigenous nuclear arsenal. 
This 'nuclear allergy' has been diagnosed as a genetic condition, and 
associated institutional and diplomatic constraints on nuclear breakout have 
been invoked to predict that Japan will ﬁnd it virtually impossible to reverse 
course on nuclear weapons. (Tellis, Denmark and Tanner 2013: 233) 
However, right-wing conservatives, like the former prime minister 
Nobusuke Kishi, argued that even the peace constitution did not prohibit 
Japan from building limited defensive nuclear weapons (Kishi 1957; 
Kishi 1967). The US commitment and capability to provide a nuclear 
umbrella in defence of Japan serve as preconditions for the latter's 
foregoing independent nuclear arsenal. But Tokyo has still developed 
an impressive civilian nuclear industry in order to possess a latent or 
'virtual' nuclear capability (Wirtz and Lavoy 2012: 20). There is no doubt 
that the nuclear hedging strategy helps Japan achieve diversiﬁed or 
even contradictory goals. On one hand, it allows Japan access to ﬁssile 
materials and technology support under the NPT regime, promoting 
the US-Japan alliance, and establishing the image of a peace-loving 
country. On the other, it still leaves a door open to nuclear breakout 
if the protection from the US proves unreliable in future; this position 
also appeases domestic hard-liners' desire for nuclear weapons. This 
explains why nuclear hedging has been adopted for such a long time 
as a strategy that meets the balance of interests.
Since the 1990s, in light of the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes 
of North Korea and the accelerating modernization of Chinese People's 
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Liberation Army (PLA), regional security has become a growing concern 
for Japan. The strategic challenge posed by China together with North 
Korea provides motivation for reshaping Tokyo's strategic options 
and deterrent posture (Lee 2013: 24-26). The mainstream still favours a 
strong US-Japan alliance. But the conﬁdence in US extended deterrence 
was shaken as Washington reduced the role of nuclear weapons, and 
moved to advance non-proliferation and disarmament (Wirtz and Lavoy 
2012: 13-28). Japan expressed its worry that 'extended deterrence could 
weaken if Washington appears too eager to placate China and Russia on 
global disarmament issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective 
or if it permits a latent North Korean nuclear capability in exchange 
for safeguards against proliferation' (Schoff 2009: 59-78). Although US 
commitment and reliability have been reafﬁrmed through the annual 
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee and later the biannual event 
of Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), there is still an obvious con-
tradiction between Washington's objectives of non-proliferation and 
disarmament, and its commitment to providing extended deterrence. 
In fact, the extended deterrence has many unsolved problems, which 
will become more challenging in the long term. As discussed above, 
Tokyo's reliance on extended deterrence corrodes its own disarmament 
diplomacy. On one hand, 'the voice of Japan calling for reduction and 
elimination of nuclear weapons is diminished because Japan is depend-
ing on the US nuclear umbrella' (Mizumoto 2004: 259). On the other 
hand, since US disarmament could trigger Japan's nuclear breakout, it 
would signiﬁcantly slow down Washington's plan for global nuclear 
disarmament (Rublee 2010: 63). Moreover, the continuing extended 
deterrence would serve as a pretext for further nuclear proliferation.
The notion of extended deterrence itself has insinuated a false sense 
of security in the minds of many Japanese people (Lee 2013: 211). The 
so-called 'nuclear umbrella' exists only because the USA is pledged to 
defend Japan and happens to possess nuclear weapons (Lewis 2010; 
Tanter and Hayes 2011: 5-21).13 'In the Nuclear Age… abandoning an 
ally risked eventual disaster, but resorting to war at the side of an ally 
guaranteed immediate catastrophe' (Kissinger 1994: 608). Many scholars 
have criticised extended deterrence as the US 'strategic insolvency' as 
the pursuit of 'yesterday's strategy under today's constraints' and the 
growing inability of the US to manage the gap between its strategic 
commitments and its national objectives (Mazarr 2012: 8). Arguably, 
'[E]xtended deterrence is a very risky business, and the US ought to 
have been glad to shed such commitments after the Cold War ended. 
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Instead, the US retains extended deterrence commitments in Asia' 
(Posen 2013: 263).
Due to the increasingly contradictory and multiple roles required of 
extended deterrence, the whole region will be under the shadow of the 
'security trilemma' instead of peace and stability. 'Actions taken by the 
US and its allies to deter or defend against North Korea may have the 
effect of making China feel less secure' (Posen 2013: 292-293). The US 
needs to not only assure Japan with extended deterrence but also reassure 
China that Washington is not pursuing regional hegemony. However, 
reassuring China is likely to worsen Japan's abandonment anxiety. Thus, 
the 'security trilemma' is an unstable status. As Posen notes:
China's ascendance in the region and its expanding military capabilities are 
of great concern to Tokyo in a longer-term, strategic sense. China's naval 
modernization, active missile program, and the impending development 
of the Jin-class ballistic missile submarine mean not only that China may 
continue to be assertive in maritime disputes but that it may soon possess 
a robust second-strike capability. (2013: 285) 
If the US homeland became more vulnerable to Chinese nuclear at-
tack, the Japanese might not believe that the US would take the risk of 
protecting its ally (Murdoch and Yeas 2009: 32-33). 
In short, nuclear hedging is a very high-cost strategy, as extended 
deterrence needs to be reviewed frequently in its changing context. It 
not only contradicts the global agenda of non-proliferation and disar-
mament, but also leads to a 'security trilemma' in the region. With the 
rapid rise of China's maritime power and nuclear arsenal, the extended 
deterrence position will become increasingly untenable. Both the estab-
lishment of KJNWFZ and nuclear breakout could serve as alternative 
options, but the latter will face insurmountable obstacles and bring 
serious consequences.
The Difﬁculties of Nuclear Breakout as an Alternative 
Option
Since it is almost inconceivable that Japan could bandwagon with China 
in the near future, nuclear breakout would be a logical choice if the US 
standing commitment were weakening. Considering the territorial dis-
putes with most regional players and the increasing threat from North 
Korea, some advocates of Japanese nuclear possession believe that it will 
be the most effective tool to protect national security. It will also enhance 
hard power, increase national prestige and make Japan a 'normal' coun-
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try.14 However, 'the path to a credible nuclear status is likely to be long 
and winding' (Yoshihara and Holmes 2012: 122). In addition to material, 
geographic, institutional and normative restraints, the consequences of 
Japan's nuclear breakout would be disastrous. Neither national security 
nor economic prosperity will be improved but would be threatened 
instead due to nuclear proliferation and the ensuing arms race.
While many believe that Japan possesses the technology to produce 
nuclear warheads in a matter of months, there are a number of reasons 
to suggest that this viewpoint is too optimistic. First and foremost, the 
costs of nuclear weapons are high. Although Japan has over 47 tons 
of reactor-grade plutonium (Japan Times 2014)15 − enough to make 
hundreds of thousands nuclear weapons, according to an internal re-
port several years ago − it will take several hundred engineers, 2 to 3 
billion USD, and three to ﬁve years to fabricate just one usable nuclear 
warhead (Yoshihara and Holmes 2012: 122). Then, owing to its lack of 
strategic depth and high population density, Japan will face the prob-
lem of ﬁnding nuclear test sites. Even if Tokyo possessed some nuclear 
weapons, the geographic limitations would massively reduce the cred-
ibility of its nuclear deterrent since most of its territory could hardly 
survive after a nuclear exchange (Thakur 1998: 147-148). Additionally, 
the Japanese government has signed various international treaties with 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and bilateral safeguards 
agreements with the US, the UK, France, Australia and Canada. Un-
like North Korea and Iran, it is almost impossible for Tokyo to bypass 
the international watchdog and develop nuclear weapons undetected. 
However, if Japan withdrew from the NPT and conducted nuclear tests 
publicly, the government would suffer not only diplomatic blowback 
but also domestic fury. 
Even if Japan had successfully overcame all of these obstacles and 
possessed an independent nuclear arsenal, its nuclear breakout would 
bring about disastrous effects. A corollary of Tokyo's nuclear armament 
would deﬁnitely precipitate reinforcement of Pyeongyang's current 
nuclear programmes. Consequently, Seoul's breaking of its non-nuclear 
commitment would be justiﬁed. Under such circumstances, it would 
also be reasonable for Beijing to improve its nuclear deterrent, which 
might cause a nuclear breakout in Taiwan. Due to the chain reaction, 
there would be a serious nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia leading 
to further instability and disturbing economic cooperation. It seems 
obvious that such a scenario would contradict the reasons why Japan 
might pursue nuclear breakout.
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Finally, as one of the essential 'threshold states'16 of the NPT regime, 
Japan's nuclear breakout would greatly damage the global agenda of 
disarmament and non-proliferation. 
If Japan - the only country to be attacked with nuclear weapons, the only 
country to argue for nonproliferation and disarmament from a tragic historical 
experience, one of the main ﬁnancial supporters of the regime - were to be 
seen as potentially withdrawing from the NPT, many other threshold states 
may wonder if the ship is sinking and whether it is time for them to leave as 
well. While we would probably not see a race to nuclearization, at the very 
least, most countries would wonder whether tackling the many difﬁcult 
issues related to disarmament was worth it, given the Japanese defection. 
(Rublee 2010: 63)
 In addition, Tokyo's nuclearization would undercut its close ties with 
the US. Since it is not in Washington's interests to deal with a nuclear 
arms race in Northeast Asia and to watch the end of the NPT regime, 
bilateral relations and security cooperation would suffer a profound 
blow. In sum, nuclear breakout, considered as one of Japan's strategic 
options, would bring danger rather than security. The path towards 
independent nuclear deterrent is full of difﬁculty and the consequences 
would seriously threaten Japan's national interests. 
The Intensiﬁcation of the Anti-Nuclear Movement after 
Fukushima, and its Limitations
According to the above theoretical evaluation, Japan's nuclear hedging 
policy will be unreliable in the long run and nuclear breakout would 
face insurmountable difﬁculties. In comparison, the KJNWFZ is the ideal 
plan for Japan's future security. However, the KJNWFZ or other similar 
NWFZ plans have never been regarded as serious alternatives by Japa-
nese government; instead they are viewed only as proposals promoted 
by academic or non-government organisations. Even when the anti-nu-
clear movement intensiﬁed after the Fukushima nuclear crisis of 2011, 
the government still refused to change its nuclear policy. The agendas of 
recent National Diet (Kokkai legislature) elections, the decision-making 
processes guiding nuclear policy, the balance of power in the decision 
circle, and the national security perceptions of these strategic actors have 
all contributed to Japan's persistence with nuclear hedging. Although the 
anti-nuclear lobby has strengthened since Fukushima,  interest groups and 
right-wing forces have successfully cited security and economic concerns 
to neutralize or suppress calls to curtail Japan's nuclear programme.
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The Collaboration of 'Zero Nuclear Power' and the Anti-
Nuclear Weapons Movement
The populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have heartily supported 
former US president Barack Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear 
weapons. The mayors of both cities signed a document proposing to 
abolish nuclear weapons at the NPT Review Conference in 2020. Both 
have also tried various measures to broaden the inﬂuence of anti-nuclear 
weapons groups, including cooperating with international NGOs and 
bidding to host the Olympic Games. Japanese scholar Kodama Katsuya 
has coined the notion the of 'Hiroshima-Nagasaki Process', borrowed 
from the Ottawa Process and Oslo Process and their respective roles in the 
Mine Ban Treaty and International Convention Banning Cluster Bombs. 
He also pointed out that the A-bombing victims groups, NGOs and non-
nuclear-weapon states would be key in implementing the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, abolishing nuclear weapons and steadily estab-
lishing a global nuclear weapons free zone (Kodama 2010: 142-49).
The movement to abolish nuclear weapons in Japan has been mainly 
organised by left-wing groups since World War Two. Although there 
were nationwide anti-nuclear protests, especially in 1950s and 1960s 
due to the 'Gensuibaku' event,17 the past decades have witnessed the 
coexistence of the anti-nuclear movement and support for peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy.18 However, since the Fukushima crisis, the traditional 
anti-nuclear weapons movement has collaborated with the 'zero nuclear 
power' movement in an unprecedented anti-nuclear effort (Kawasaki 
2013: 593-614). Akira Kawasaki, executive committee member of the 
Tokyo-based NGO Peace Boat, pointed out that it is time to revive 
Japan's anti-war peace movement and learn the lessons of Fukushima. 
He considers it essential to connect the protests with campaigns of 
politicians and local government (Kawasaki 2011: 89-90). Takao Taka-
hara, a professor from Meijigakuin University, argues that the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) government obstinately maintains the nuclear 
umbrella and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, without considering the as-
sociated high risks (Takahara 2012: 129-31).
At the annual peace event held in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 
2011, the mayors of both cities emphasised the dangers of using nuclear 
energy. Gensuikyo, the biggest anti-nuclear weapons organisation in Ja-
pan, has led other NGOs to join the lobby asking for 'zero nuclear power'. 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government at that time launched 
a national debate on the nuclear energy issue and received a petition of 
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over 90,000 names demanding the closure of all nuclear plants. In 2012, 
large crowds of protestors and NGO activists gathered before the prime 
minister's residence almost every week to protest against the restart-
ing of nuclear plants after the crisis. The scale of these demonstrations 
consistently grew, with hundreds of thousands of people setting a new 
record for social movements in Japan. Over 60,000 people attended the 
protest in Tokyo in September 2011, 160,000 people in July 2012, and 
another 60,000 gathered in June 2013 (Kawasaki 2013: 598). In contrast 
to the post-war movement organised by left-wing groups, the new 
movement is beyond the left and right, and consists of people from all 
walks of life. A recent poll commissioned by Asahi Shimbun showed that 
nearly 60 per cent of respondents opposed the restart of nuclear plants 
due to the Fukushima crisis (Aldrich and Platte 2014; Asahi Shimbun 
2013; Tsukimori 2013).19 More and more people have been reminded of 
the disaster brought by the atomic bombing (Lee 2013: 201). Even the 
hawkish Junichiro Koizumi and Morihiro Hosokawa criticised LDP's 
trying to restart the nuclear plants and called for 'zero nuclear power' 
(Sankei News 2014).20
The movement has spread across the country. From 2011 to 2014, 
the annual Praying for Peace event was organised in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki by the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC) and other 
local governments including Kumamoto, Okayama, Chiba, Akita, and 
Hokkaido (Japanese Trade Union Confederation 2013; Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation 2015).21 The Research Center for Nuclear Weapons 
Abolition at Nagasaki University has launched a series of international 
conferences on the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone since 
2012 (Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition 2015).22 The win-
ner of the 1994 Nobel Prize in Literature, Kenzaburo Oe, has led several 
major anti-nuclear protests in Tokyo since 2011 (The New York Times 
2012; The Japan Times 2013).23 Japan Peace Committee not only sup-
ported nationwide anti-nuclear campaigns, but also criticised Japan's 
nuclear policy and called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free 
zone in its monthly magazine Peace Movement (Japan Peace Committee 
2015).24 In 2014, there were more than 150 articles attacking the LDP's 
nuclear policy in Zenshin, the weekly magazine of Japanese Communist 
Party (Weekly Zenshin 2015).25 With the launch of the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference and the 70th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
atomic bombing, the Gensuikin, Kakkin and JTUC have initiated activ-
ity to collect 10 million signatures calling for the abolition of nuclear 
weapons (Japanese Trade Union Confederation 2015).26
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Although nuclear energy policy differs from nuclear weapons policy 
to some extent, the development of civilian nuclear technology is very 
closely connected with nuclear breakout, particularly in Japan (Fujita 
2011). Former prime minister Nobusuke Kishi argued that the peace 
constitution did not forbid Japan holding limited defensive nuclear 
weapons and that the country had to possess the technology to build 
tactical nuclear weapons independently. To meet both military and 
civilian needs, the Kishi government decided to purchase the Calder 
Hall nuclear reactor from Britain in order to reduce Japan's dependence 
on nuclear technology transfer from the US, and to stockpile plutonium 
fuel for nuclear research or breakout in the future (Sato 2015: 29-48). 
Kishi did not only regard nuclear technology as an indispensable part 
of Japan's economic recovery and social development after the WW2, 
but also as crucial for potentially acquiring nuclear weapons, promoting 
international prestige and realising national independence. Declassiﬁed 
diplomatic archives from 1969 reveal that when the Japanese government 
was discussing whether to join the NPT, it was widely agreed that Japan 
should have the economic and technological potential to build nuclear 
weapons despite its non-nuclear-weapon status (Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1969a: 67-68). Even today, maintaining Japan's nuclear 
potential remains a major reason for the LDP government to restart nu-
clear plants post-Fukushima (Kono 2011: 84-85; Suzuki 2011: 178-79).
National Diet Elections, Nuclear Policy Decision-Making 
and the Limitations of Anti-Nuclear Groups 
The unprecedented anti-nuclear protests after Fukushima have strength-
ened the 'nuclear allergy' in Japan, but have thus far failed to change the 
government's nuclear policy. Despite the anti-nuclear campaigns, the 
LDP has won several landslide victories in the National Diet elections 
and held its leadership since 2012. The reasons for this are as follows: 
1) the Fukushima crisis happened during the DPJ's term and the party 
failed to deal effectively with the disaster due to its lack of experience 
and constraints from interest groups (Krauss 2013: 191-92). This was a 
heavy blow for the DPJ but a good opportunity for the LDP to regain 
the leadership at the next opportunity (Kingston 2013: 501-21); 2) since 
the political reform in 1994, the mixed-member majoritarian system 
has been accused of favouring LDP (Hrebenar 1986: 47).27 Furthermore, 
although most of the opposition parties support the realisation of 'zero 
nuclear power' and a nuclear weapons free zone as soon as possible 
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(see Appendix II for reference), these newly emerging small parties 
have split the voters to counterattack the LDP (East Asia Forum 2014, 
2015);28 and 3) in the past several elections, economic growth and secu-
rity issues have proven to be more important to voters than the nuclear 
policy agenda (Kingston 2013: 501-21). The policy of 'Abenomics' brings 
hope for Japan's economy, which has experienced staggering growth 
for more than two decades.29 Shintaro Ishihara, a right-wing politician, 
made a speech in 2012 stating that he would represent the Japanese 
government to purchase the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in order to end 
the territorial dispute between China and Japan. His island-buying move 
caused tension in bilateral relations, but was also a big opportunity for 
the LDP to speed up militarization. To cater to the right-wing, the Abe 
government further promoted historical revisionism, exercising the 
right of collective self-defence and reinterpreting the constitution. The 
continued tensions between Japan and China, and frequent provoca-
tions from North Korea, have made Abe's conservative policy more 
convincing. The result of the National Diet election in 2012 revealed 
that although the public was not satisﬁed with LDP's policy on nuclear 
energy, they still favoured Abe's LDP overall, thus marginalizing the 
anti-nuclear lobby in the political process. 
The so-called 'nuclear village complex' in Japan, which consists of 
nuclear industry, bureaucratic agency and the National Diet, has mo-
nopolized technology and resources so as to make a closed decision 
circle in nuclear policy decision making. Lacking systemic political 
inﬂuence, civilian groups cannot get involved in the decision-making 
process. In contrast, according to Jacques Hymans' analysis of 'veto 
players' (see Ganghof 2003: 1-25; Tsebelis 2000: 441-74), the ﬂexibility 
of Japan's nuclear policy depends on those decision-makers who have 
the veto power. If these veto players cannot reach consensus, there will 
not be any serious policy shift (Hymans 2011: 154-89). 
From the perspective of nuclear energy policy, the 'zero nuclear 
power' campaign faces challenges from veto players, including the nu-
clear industry, power companies, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) and Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC). Interest 
groups like the Keidanren, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Japan Association of Corporate Executives and other big companies 
have continuously pressed to restart nuclear plants (Aldrich 2012: 2-5). 
Additionally, because of the increasing expense of imported energy, 
caused by the depreciation of the Yen, many people were worried about 
whether economic development can be sustained without a supply of 
_________________________________________________________________________97
_____________________________________________________ Japan's Nuclear Options
nuclear energy. Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi as the global giants of 
nuclear energy are sparing no effort in promoting new projects, expand-
ing exports and occupying market share (Dawson, Spegele and Williams 
2012).30 One senior ofﬁcial from METI stated that as long as some coun-
tries still prefer nuclear power, Japan has to meet their needs.31 Finally, 
the JAEC rejects zero nuclear power, as this would render research into 
nuclear technology and the safety regulation of nuclear power unneces-
sary, and lead to the collapse of the commission.
Similarly, the anti-nuclear weapons campaign faces major challenge 
from the right-wing forces. The idea that possessing defensive nuclear 
weapons is in accordance with the Japanese constitution was put for-
ward as early as 1957 by the Kishi government. Former prime minister 
Hayato Ikeda's 1961 cabinet also had many in favour of Japan possessing 
nuclear weapons (Sugita 2005: 81). Before joining the NPT, former prime 
minister Eisaku Sato stated that Japan should have nuclear weapons as 
long as other countries did (Asahi Shinbun 2005). According to declas-
siﬁed documents from the 1960s released by the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, it is clear that nuclear weapons were considered indis-
pensable for dealing with China and for asserting Japan's position on 
the global stage (Yatabe 1968: 18). Since neither the Japanese 'nuclear 
allergy' nor the US-Japan alliance could be viewed as permanent, Japan 
should be prepared for nuclear breakout (Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1968: 13). In 1969, senior ofﬁcials told the West German govern-
ment that Japan would develop nuclear weapons if necessary (Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1969b).
Following the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the Japanese gov-
ernment conducted internal research on whether to change its nuclear 
policy. In 1995, the report published by the Ministry of Defence pointed 
out that nuclear breakout would damage Japan's national interests and 
regional security. Despite this, in 1999 the vice-defence minister Shingo 
Nishimura argued that Japan should possess nuclear weapons (French 
1999).32 Although Nishimura later resigned, his view was favoured by 
many politicians, including Keizo Obuchi (Japan Energy Scan 1999).33 
In 2002, Ozawa Ichiro, the chief secretary of the LDP made a statement 
claiming that Japan was able to produce thousands of nuclear bombs and 
so did not fear China's military build-up. Then the chief cabinet secretary 
Yasuo Fukuda argued that the peace constitution did not forbid Japan 
from acquiring limited nuclear weapons to protect national security, 
and Shinzo Abe, then the vice-chief cabinet secretary, also believed there 
would be no problems so long as the nuclear weapons were limited 
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in scale (Kakuchi 2002; French 2002).34 In 2004, former prime minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone revealed in his memoirs that Japan had considered 
developing nuclear weapons back in the 1970s and that he himself also 
supported Japan having small nuclear weapons (Yoshida 2004).35 Two 
years later, the foreign minister Aso Taro and the chairman of the LDP's 
Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) Nakagawa Shoichi attempted 
to initiate a debate on nuclear breakout (Hogg 2006),36 even arguing that 
the only way to deal with nuclear-weapon-states would be for Japan to 
possess its own nuclear weapons (Kyodo News 2009).37 
Japan's right-wing conservatives have long hoped to possess nu-
clear weapons, in order to promote the country's political and military 
power. Those political groups in favour of nuclear breakout argue that, 
according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Tokyo retains the 
right to withdraw from NPT only when the country's core interests are 
threatened. Since there is no sign of denuclearization in North Korea, 
and China's development has raised tensions, those who support nu-
clear breakout see an opportunity (Panda 2014: 407-25). As the Koizumi 
government expanded the scope of the Self-Defence Force in 2004, and 
the Abe government has further expedited Japan's remilitarization 
(Hughes 2009a; Hook and Son 2013; Jo 2016), the right-wing inﬂuence 
on Japanese politics continues to grow. Since the KJNWFZ plan makes 
the alternative of nuclear breakout completely impossible, it would need 
to be overruled by these strategic actors or so-called 'veto players'. 
Japan's Security Environment and Threat Perception
 Since it is now almost impossible for Japan to realise nuclear breakout, 
the country's last resort of national defence is its US ally or international 
institutions like the NWFZ, which provides positive and negative secu-
rity assurances. There is thus a debate over whether realists or liberal 
institutionalists can better improve national security. The KJNWFZ plan 
is the approach of choice for liberal institutionalism as it is based on 
international law and norms, the protection of the United Nations and 
commitment from nuclear-weapon-states, and the belief that institutions 
can alter states' preferences, promote cooperation and avoid conﬂicts. 
However, the realist camp38 maintains that institutions, as a reﬂection of 
the distribution of power in the world, can hardly mitigate the interna-
tional anarchy, which fosters competition and inhibits cooperation. From 
the realist perspective, nuclear weapons deter attacks and make war less 
likely (Sagan and Waltz 1995), so this camp argues for the development 
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of nuclear weapons (self-help) or reliance on the 'nuclear umbrella' (al-
liance). The debate between realism and liberal institutionalism may 
never be resolved, but the state's nuclear choices are determined by 
the speciﬁc regional security context (Paul 2000). A closer examination 
of Japan's security environment and threat perception reveals why the 
KJNWFZ plan has not been convincing and why many strategic actors 
are in favour of nuclear hedging, despite its many problems.
  Japan's current regional security context provides little basis for the 
liberalist position. In 2004, former prime minister Koizumi argued that 
'the UN will not deploy forces to ﬁght with Japan and prevent an inva-
sion'39 if there were a critical incident. In contrast to Europe, the Cold 
War in Northeast Asia has not ended. Regional ﬂash points such as the 
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits are perceived as existential 
threats to Japan. 'Given the lack of any collective security framework in 
Asia, the US bilateral alliance system remains the lynchpin of regional 
stability and security' (Cronin 2005: 71-72). Besides the strengthening of 
the US-Japan alliance, the closer strategic partnership of China and Rus-
sia, and the further development of North Korea's missiles and nuclear 
weapons, underpin 'the enduring emphasis on realism in Northeast 
Asia' (Rozman 2007: 280). Since all the regional players prefer the realist 
approach, Tokyo would struggle to offer a solid liberal response.  
  The power structures in Northeast Asia are pushing Japan towards 
a balancing strategy. Japan faces a great threat from North Korea due to 
nuclear weapons, missiles and the abduction issue of the 1970s and 80s.40 
However, North Korea also serves as 'a catch-all proxy threat to justify 
changes in security policy that are simultaneously driven by the greater 
long-term, but diplomatically unacceptable to articulate, threat from China' 
(Hughes 2009b: 311). Due to territorial disputes and the chain of events caus-
ing mutual distrust, Japanese public opinion polls in recent years reveal a 
growing perception of China as a threat (Watanabe 2015).41 At the ofﬁcial 
level, Japan's National Security Strategy of December 2013 identiﬁed China, 
alongside North Korea, as the major security challenge in Asia-Paciﬁc. Japan 
is seriously concerned about China's attempts to change the regional status 
quo by force, escalating existing territorial disputes and establishing the Air 
Defense Identiﬁcation Zone (ADIZ).42 Recent editions of Japan's defence re-
ports have echoed this assessment.43 'China's increasingly assertive regional 
behavior combined with a nontransparent military buildup' has inﬂuenced 
Japan's security policy shift towards expedited remilitarization (internal bal-
ance) and strengthening of the US-Japan alliance (external balance) (Ebert, 
Flemes and Struver 2014: 221). 
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As Northeast Asia, haunted by geopolitical competition and lack of 
any regional security mechanism for decades, witnesses China's rise, 
it is natural for Japan to respond with a balancing strategy. Japan, as a 
secondary power in the region, seeks to maximize national security and 
reduce the relative advantage of its ascendant neighbour. Nuclear hedg-
ing is still the best-ﬁt strategy, as it borrows deterrence from the US while 
keeping nuclear potential to convince China that any serious conﬂict or 
hegemonic behaviour may lead to nuclear acquisition in Japan. 
While KJNWFZ would also provide defence through international 
institutions, it limits Tokyo's nuclear alternatives. If the plan is carried 
out, the stockpile of plutonium will become more problematic, and this 
might lead to the wipe-out of Japan's nuclear potential. The KJNWFZ 
plan does not ﬁt Japan's realist logic of national strategy determined 
by the regional security context. This is why the KJNWFZ has failed 
to attract a majority of strategic actors in the decision-making circle 
and will never convince those conservatives who seek to make Japan 
a 'normal country'.
Conclusion
This article began with an exploration of Japan's nuclear strategic op-
tions, namely nuclear hedging, nuclear breakout and the establishment 
of a KJNWFZ. While the US-Japan alliance is in its best ever form, there 
is still analytical utility in considering the problems of extended deter-
rence in the long term. Extended deterrence will not only contradict 
the increasingly important global agenda of disarmament and non-
proliferation, but will also lead to a 'security trilemma' in Northeast 
Asia. With the rapid rise of China's military power, the credibility of a 
nuclear umbrella will be seriously challenged. Consequently, Tokyo's 
current nuclear hedging policy will be out of date and a new frame-
work will be necessary. Nuclear breakout will not be an ideal strategic 
alternative. Although Japan possesses advanced nuclear technology 
and large quantities of ﬁssile materials, it will cost too much to produce 
nuclear warheads. In addition to geographic limitations, Tokyo will not 
bypass the international regulatory institutions and win the support of 
its domestic public, especially after the Fukushima crisis. Furthermore, 
the outcomes of a Japanese nuclear breakout would precipitate an arms 
race and great damage to the NPT regime. Neither national security 
nor economic prosperity will be enhanced through such a strategy. In 
theory, the KJNWFZ initiative is a wise strategic option. It would re-
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place the 'nuclear umbrella' with the NSA while serving as a measure of 
conﬁdence-building to improve Japan's relations with both China and 
the two Koreas. It will not only protect Tokyo from nuclear strike and 
nuclear blackmail but also diffuse a potential regional arms race. The 
establishment of the KJNWFZ would correct Japan's incoherent nuclear 
diplomacy and increase its soft power as a peaceful state. It would also 
likely become a stepping-stone for multilateral security cooperation in 
Northeast Asia.
However, the Japanese government does not regard the KJNWFZ 
plan as a practical strategy and there have been few changes to nuclear 
policy, despite unprecedented anti-nuclear protests led by both peace 
organisations and the zero nuclear energy campaign after the Fuku-
shima crisis. In the National Diet elections, the LDP won on agendas 
like economic growth and national security, despite the electorate's 
broad opposition to nuclear power. Civilian anti-nuclear groups failed 
to inﬂuence the political process effectively in the face of lobbying by 
the 'veto-players' in the nuclear policy decision-making circle. The 
nuclear industry, power companies and METI vetoed the zero nuclear 
energy policy, while the heavy industry and right-wing forces vetoed 
the KJNWFZ plan. Nuclear policy has been determined according to the 
balance of interests among 'veto players' for several decades and there 
is insufﬁcient momentum for policy change or ﬂexibility (Hymans 2011: 
154-89). Last but not least, the regional security context also inﬂuences 
decision-makers' threat perception and limits Japan's nuclear options. 
As the shadow of the Cold War still lingers over Northeast Asia, Chi-
na's rise leaves little scope for Japan to try its luck with the KJNWFZ. 
Instead, Japan sticks with the established nuclear hedging, in line with 
the grand strategy of balancing which convinces most strategic actors 
in the decision-making circle.
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Appendix I Anti-Nuclear Organisations and Campaigns44




2009 Tokyo Conducts research on non-proliferation and 
disarmament, and spreads knowledge about 
nuclear issues.
National Council of 




Calls for global campaign to abolish nuclear 
weapons and promotes peace movement.
Japan Association 




Promotes signing the treaty to abolish nuclear 
weapons and offers legal aid to the victims of 
nuclear strikes or accidents.
Physicians Against 
Nuclear War
1987 Tokyo Protests against nuclear weapons and cooper-
ates with international and domestic peace 
NGOs.
All Japan Teachers 
and Staffs Union
1991 Tokyo Campaigns to abolish nuclear weapons and 
promotes peace movement.
Japan Confederation 
of A- and H-Bomb 
Sufferers Organisa-
tions
1956 Tokyo Cooperates with domestic NGOs and inter-
national organisations on non-proliferation, 
collects data and information about victims 




1975 Tokyo Promotes abolishment of nuclear weapons and 
realisation of a peaceful human society.
New Japan Wom-
en's Association
1962 Tokyo Rejects nuclear weapons, which threaten the 




1949 Tokyo Protects the peace constitution, promotes abol-
ishment of nuclear weapons, and organises an 
annual anti-nuclear forum.






Conducts research on non-proliferation and 
disarmament, promotes the idea of Northeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and spreads 
knowledge about nuclear issues.
Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki
Records the history of victims and builds local 
peace museums to promote the abolishment of 





1954 Tokyo Campaigns against nuclear war and nuclear 
weapons, and provides aid to the victims of 
the A-bombs, including the annual World 
Conference against A & H Bombs, constant and 
nationwide signature campaigns for a ban on 
nuclear weapons, events and actions in cooper-
ation with the victims to make known the dam-
age of the A-bombings to the general public.
Gensuikin Peace 
Forum
1965 Tokyo Holds a peace conference every March and 
promotes anti-nuclear power and anti-nuclear 
weapons movement.
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Appendix II Japanese Political Parties' Positions on Nuclear Energy 
and Nuclear Weapons Issues after the Fukushima Crisis45




To implement the zero nuclear 
energy policy (Sep.25.2012); to 
give up restarting nuclear plants, 
close the Rokkasho Nuclear 
Reprocessing Plant, forbid ex-
porting nuclear technology and 
implement zero nuclear energy 
policy (June.2013); stick to zero 
nuclear energy policy (Novem-
ber 2014).
To abolish nuclear weapons and 
realize zero nuclear Japan (No-
vember 2012); to realize the zero 




To replace nuclear energy with 
other new energy (April 20, 
2011); initiate the basic law of 
anti-nuclear energy and cooper-
ate with other 5 parties in the 
National Diet which won 26 sup-
ports (Sep.7.2012)
To stick to the peace constitu-
tion and the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles, and promote Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone in Northeast 
Asia (2014)
Komeito To protest against restarting nu-
clear plants and replace nuclear 
energy with other new energy.
Komeito Chief Representative 
Natsuo Yamaguchi attended the 
Hiroshima peace event on Au-
gust 6, 2014 and issued an appeal 







To forbid restarting nuclear 
plants and support research on 
other new energy
To stick to the peace constitution, 
lead the global disarmament 
agenda, and establish a peaceful 




To forbid restarting nuclear 
plants and realize zero nuclear 
energy (2013)
To promote realizing the zero 
nuclear world as the only victim 




To have stable and secure energy 
supply, develop new energy and 
sustain advanced nuclear energy 
projects; to get rid of nuclear 
energy after having stable supply 
from other new energy
Ishinnotoh To support research and de-
velopment of new energy and 
establish new safety regulations 




To restore conﬁdence in Japan's 
nuclear industry, reform the 
safety regulation, expand invest-
ment in the development of new 
energy, and believe that nuclear 
energy is still important in the 
background of climate change
Although Japan should lead 
global disarmament agenda and 
protect NTP regime, it is essen-
tial to have a comprehensive dis-
cussion on Japan's nuclear policy 
in order to secure its national 
interests.
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Appendix III 'Veto Players' in the Decision-Making Process of Japan's 
Nuclear Policy (based on Hymans 2011: 154-56)
   1950s     1960s






























Science and Technology 
Agency
Atomic Energy Research 
Institute
PM
Private 
Industry
Decision-
making
AECJ
